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ABSTRACT
What is the optimal number of currencies in the world? Common currencies affect trading
costs and, thereby, the amounts of trade, output, and consumption. From the perspective of monetary
policy, the adoption of another country's currency trades off the benefits of commitment to price
stability against the loss of an independent stabilization policy. The nature of the tradeoff depends on co-
movements of disturbances, on distance, trading costs, and on institutional arrangements such as the
willingness of anchor countries to accommodate to the interests of clients.
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Taditiona1ly, each country had its own currency, and only one currency
circulated in each country. Monetary unions were rare, and, therefore, the
surge in the number of countries in the post-war period generated a large
increase in the number of currencies circulating in the world. In 1947 there
were 76 countries in the world, today there are 193, and, with few exceptions,
each country has its own currency.' Unless one believes that a country is, by
definition, an "optimal currency area," either there were too few currencies
in 1947 or there are too many today. In fact, the increasing integration of
international markets implies that the optimal number of currencies would
tend to decrease, rather than almost triple as it has.
Only recently, however, and perhaps as a result of this proliferation of
currencies, the sanctity of "one country one money" has come into question.
Eleven countries in Europe have adopted the same currency, dollarization
is under active consideration in many countries in Latin America and is
currently being implemented in Ecuador, and a currency union is being dis-
cussed in Central America. Countries in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union are considering adopting unilaterally the euro. In addition,
several countries have adopted currency boards, including Hong Kong and
Argentina with the dollar and Estonia and Bulgaria first with the German
mark and later with the euro.
'See Rose (2000) for a list of countries that use currencies other than their own. Two
examples of currency unions are the French Franc Zone in Africa and the Caribbean
currency union. Some other countries that use another nation's currency are Panama,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and San Marino.
2Two factors have contributed to these trends. One is the increase in
international trade in goods and services, expanded cross-border financial
transactions, and heightened cross-country flows of technology, in one word,
"globalization." The second is the increased emphasis on price stability,
as opposed to active macroeconomic stabilization, as a goal for monetary
policy. This switch followed two decades (the seventies and eighties) with
exceptionally high inflation rates in many developing countries and double-
digit inflation in several industrial ones.
Mundell (1961) pioneered the analysis of monetary union. The benefit
of a common-currency area was its role in minimizing transaction costs and
facilitating the flow of information about re'ative prices.2 The offsetting
force was that fixed exchange rates entailed the loss of independent monetary
policies. Mundell stressed factor mobility and price flexibility as key elements
in this tradeoff.
In this paper, we begin by investigating the role of monetary union in
reducing the transaction costs for foreign trade. This benefit is greater the
larger the size of the union, because money, like language, is more useful
the greater the number of persons who share the same type. We then add
monetary issues, emphasizing the distinctionS between rules and discretion
as in Barro and Gordon (1983). Flexible exchange rates allow monetary
2Several papers have investigated the effects of exchange rate stability on trade flows,
reaching mixed results. See, in particular, Hooper and Kohihagen (1978), Kenen and
Rodrik (1986), and International Monetary Fund (1984). Rose (2000) argues that the
effect of currency union on the volume of trade is large.
3There is now a large literature on the rules-versus-discretion trade off. An application
of that framework that is especially related to the present paper is in Alesina and Grilli
3independence, but the in onetary authorities Of many countries lack the ability
to commit their policies to a stable and predictable rule. Policies carried out
under these conditions may produce high and variable inflation. In contrast,
a system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates may be useful as a discipline
device to assure price stability. However, this mechanism works effectively
only if the domestic authority is willing to subordinate its monetary policy to
the fixing of the exchange rate. Dollarization—or, less extreme, a currency
board—is attractive as a way to ensure the credibility of a fixed-rate system.
However, even with a permanently fixed exchange rate, as guaranteed by
full dollarization, a country would experience changes in prices relative to
those of the anchoring country. These relative price movements reduce the
desirability of fixed exchange rates. Therefore, countries would prefer to link
to anchors with which they have small variations in relative prices.
The analysis is complicated by two factors that we take into account.
First, the choice of regime tends itself to affect the variances of relative
prices and the co-movements of output. Second, the anchor country's mon-
etary policy may change as a function of which countries adopt the anchor's
currency. This adjustment of policy may feature compensation schemes be-
tween "clients" and "anchors," possibly involving the amount of seignorage
revenue accruing to the various governments.
After discussing the pros and cons of adopting another country's currency,
we study how, given a distribution of independent countries, certain types
of currency unions would emerge in equilibrium. Under a broad range of
conditions, an increase in the number of countries (thus, a reduction in their
(1992).
4average size) would increase the desirability of currency unions. Hence, as the
number of countries increases, the number of currencies should increase less
than proportionately. In fact, wider certain conditions, if one moves from,
say, 100 countries to 200, the total number of currencies circulating may
decrease in absolute terms. Consequently, in a world of small and highly
integrated countries, where the benefits of low and stable inflation are highly
vajued, one should observe a collapse of the one-country one-money identity
and a move toward a world with relatively few currencies.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a model
that highlights the pros and cons that a country faces when considering the
adoption of a foreign currency. The following section discusses the endoge-
nous formation of currency unions given a distribution of sizes of independent
countries. The last section concludes.
2 A Model of Currency Unions
2.1 Output, Trade, and Country Size
We begin with a simple model of the real economy with a role for trade and
country size. The text contains a sketch of the model with the mainS results.
The details are in the appendix.
Suppose that the world consists of W individuals or economic regions,
each of which has a fixed labor endowment, L. We can view these individuals
as arrayed along a line segment, starting from the origin and then having
equally spaced points at the positions r =1,...,W.
Each individual produces output, Yr,usinga varieties-type production
5function, which was originated by Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
and Ethier (1982),
YrA (ç) (1)
where A > 0 is a parameter, Xv,. is the amount of nondurable intermedi-
ate input of type v used by individual r, and 0 cc a < 1. Output, Y,., can
be used on a one-for-one basis for consumption, Cr, or to produce r-type
intermediates, X,.. All consumer goods are identical, but each person pro-
duces a unique variety of intermediate. Prices of consumer goods are the
same everywhere and are normalized to one. Person r is assumed to have
monopoly power over the supply of his or her unique type of intermediate,
Xr. The price set for this good is denoted by Pr, where F,. > 1 will apply.
The production fimction in equation (1) implies that every individual will
want to use all of the available intermediate goods as long as all of the prices
are finite.
A country is a collection of adjacent individuals. The size of country i,
measured by the number of individuals, is denoted by N. Within each coun-
try, there is assumed to be free trade and no transaction costs for shipping
goods. The shipping of an intermediate good across country borders entails
transaction costs, which can reflect trade barriers and differences in language
and currency. (For simplicity, we neglect any transaction costs for shipping
consumer goods.) Specifically, we assume an iceberg technology, whereby,
for each unit of intermediate good shipped from one country to another,
only 1 —bunits arrive, with 0 < b < 1. The transaction costs would gener-
ally depend on the country pairs involved—for example, on distance and on
6differences in language-but we neglect these heterogeneities for now.4
Each producer of intermediates selects a single price, Pr, which applies at
the point of origin for domestic purchasers and foreigners. Since foreigners
receive only 1 —bunits for each unit purchased, their effective price per unit
of r-type intermediate employed in production is Pr/(1 —b).Thus, trade
within a country faces monopoly pricing, whereas international trade faces
monopoly pricing and shipping costs.
Each individual r chooses the quantity of intermediates to buy at home or
abroad, Xvr, for v =1,...,W(r);the quantity of own output to retain for
use as an intermediate input, Xrr; and the price of its intermediate, Pr. The
choice of the quantity of each type of intermediate to import takes as given
the monopoly prices, P, set by vr. Given the demand function for thert1
intermediate good, the setting of Fr determines the quantity of intermediate
goods sold by i-.Thebudget constraint determines consumption, Cr, as
output, Yr, less the amount of retained intermediates, Xrr, plus the net
revenue from sales abroad and at home (the quantity sold multiplied by
[Pr —11), lessthe amount paid for purchasing intermediates. The terms
involving imports and exports take account of the iceberg losses on goods
transported across country borders. The objective of each individual is to
maximize Cr.
4A large empirical literature has shown that political borders matter greatly for the
volume of trade. That is, regions of the same country trade with each other much more
than they would if they were independent. See, for example, McCallum (1995) and Hel-
liwell (1998). More generally, the "home-bias" effect is pervasive in various aspects of
international economic relationships, as discussed in a unified framework by Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000).
7We show in the appendix that each producer of intermediates faces a
demand curve with the constant elasticity —1/(1 —a).This demand curve
leads to the choice of the monopoly price or "markup ratio," Pr =1/a> 1,
which is the same for all varieties of intermediate goods. The appendix also
shows that the equilibrium level of output for individual r is given by
Yr =AL.{i + [(Ni —1)+ (1 —b)a/()(W —Ni)]},(2)
where A Ah/(1)aa/(1_U) and N is the size of the country to which r
belongs.Note, inside the brackets in equation (2), that the production for
own use counts as 1, the other N —1members of the same country count
with the weight aa/() < 1 because of monopoly pricing of the traded
intermediates, and the W —Nforeigners count with the even smaller weight
[a (1 —b)]/'< 1 because of monopoly pricing and shipping costs. From
the perspective of incentives to produce, monopoly pricing and trading costs
have similar and reinforcing effects.
We show in the appendix that trades in intermediates between individuals
in a country and across country borders are balanced. Hence, there are no
net trades across borders in consumer goods Trade in intermediates is partly
domestic, that is, among residents of the same country, and partly foreign,
that is, across country borders. The volume of trade (value of exports or
imports) for region rwiththe other N —1regions of the same country is
Value of domestic trade =ALa"'.(N
—1), (3)
and that with all of the foreign regions is




8The country totals of domestic and foreign trade equal N1 multiplied by the
expressions in Eqs. (3) and (4), respectively. The ratios of trade to output
are given by
(N11) Value of domestic trade/output =
1+ aa/(1_a). [(N1—1)+ (1 — . (w — N1)]
(5)
and
a1/(1_0). (1—b)°/(1)(W —N) Value of foreign trade/output =
1+ &I('). [(N1—1)+ (1 —b)a/().(W
—N1)]
(6)
Note that the output concept given in equation (2) is gross of production
of intermediates. In the case of balanced trade in intermediates, net output
corresponds to consumption, which equals gross output less production of
intermediates (including those that vanish due to the iceberg trading costs
for international transactions). The appendix shows that the formula for
consumption is




The qualitative implications of equations (2)-(7) are intuitively reason-
able and generalize beyond the specific model that we have adopted. The
implications include the following:
• If trading costs, b, were zero and pricing were competitive (which cor-
responds to a =1),then YT/L and Cr/L would be proportional to the
size of the world, W. This scale benefit arises because a larger world
9means more varieties of intermediate inputs. In this case, the size of
the country, N, wou]d not matter. More generally, for given N, a
higher W raises Yr/L and Cr/L.
• If trading costs exist, then YT/L and Cr/L increase with N for given
W. This effect arises because an increase in the size of the country
expands the number of intermediate inputs for which the trading costs
are nil.
• Yr/L and Cr/L are decreasing in the international trading cost param-
eter, b.
• For given W, the larger the country, N, the smaller is the effect of
trading costs, b, on Yr/L and Cr/U Analogously, the lower b, the
smaller is the effect of country size, N, on Yr/U and Cr/L.
• The ratio of foreign trade to output falls with b and N. The ratio of
trade within a country to output rises with b and N.5
For given country sizes and trading costs, the distorting element in the
model comes from the monopoly pricing of the intermediate goods. A social
planner for the world would effectively price each of these goods at 1, rather
than Pr =1/a> 1. Output, denoted by }, would then be higher than
before, corresponding to the replacement of the term a0/(1_a)inequation
51f the production for own use is negligible, which holds, for example, if N >>1,then
these two effects are nearly offsetting. In this case, changes in trading costs, b, and country
size, N do not have a significant effect on the ratio of total trade to output.
10(2) by 1:
(8)
This result assumes that the social planner takes as given the sizes of coun-
tries, N, and must pay the costs b for inter-country trades. If country i
contains many individuals, so that N >> 1, then the shortfall of production
due to monopoly pricing is given from equations (2) and (8) by
ic/i';a/(1-a)<1. (9)
In this model, consumption per person (and, hence, the utility of the
representative consumer) would be maximized if the entire world consisted
of one country, because cross-border transaction costs would then be elimi-
nated. However, this conclusion arises only because we have neglected some
costs that tend to rise with the size of the country. In particular, larger
political jurisdictions typically have to deal with a more heterogeneous citi-
zenry. The growing heterogeneity makes it increasingly difficult to agree on
a set of polices and institutions. In addition, diseconomies of scale in public
administration tend to emerge at some level of countiy size.
Suppose that the per capita costs of heterogeneity are an increasing func-
tion of country size and can be represented by the function h(N), with
h'(.) > 0. Then, in an interior equilibrium, the optimal size of a country is
determined by the condition that the marginal benefit of size, emerging from
equation (2), equal the marginal cost of heterogeneity.6 Given the symmetry
of the model, this condition will tend to dictate that all countries be of the
6This kind of tradeoff for determining country size is the one emphasized in Barro
(1991), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), and Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000).
11same size. However, if the heterogeneity costs—or the costs of trading across
country borders—depend on the identity of the individuals, then we can have
equilibria in which countries have different optimal sizes. In any event, we
treat the country sizes, N, as exogenous in the present context.
2.2 Currency Unions and Trading Costs
The model just described shows how trading costs, b, influence the volume of
foreign trade and, hence, the levels of production and consumption in each
region. If we extend the model to allow the trading cost to depend on the
country pairs, i and j,thenthe volume of trade (value of exports or imports)
between countries i and j,isgiven from a generalization of equation (4) by
Value of trade between countries i and j= ALa111".(1
— .
(10)
whereis the trading cost between the countries. This expression for trade
is the aggregate of the value of exports of interemediate goods from all of the
regions of country i to all of the regions of country j.Correspondingly,the
contribution of this foreign trade to the output and consumption in country
i (or country j)followsfrom generalizations of Eqs. (2) and (7) as
Effect on output of country i =AL'1'.(1
—b)"Al°) NN3, (11)
Effect on consumption of country i =AL.(1 —a2)
.a/(1-a) . (1— .
(12)
One component of the trading cost,consists of shipping costs, which
depend on distance and available methods of transportation. Other com-
ponents would involve government regulations, familiarity with foreign rules
12and business practices, and so on. In addition, trading costs would depend
on financial considerations, including currency exchanges. We assume that
the cost parameter, b1, can be expressed as the sum of two elements: the
first, reflects all but the financial aspects, and the second, contains
the financial terms. We assume that b2 is lower if countries share the same
currency than if they use different currencies. Hence,the adoption of a com-
mon currency tends, on this count, to promote trade and, thereby, to raise
output and consumption.
One question is whether countries that naturally trade more because of a
smaller trading cost b11 would be more inclined to adopt a common currency.
Specifically, is the net benefit from lowering the financial part of trading costs,
b21, greater if the other part of trading costs, is larger or smaller? To
address this question, we assume that the use of a common currency involves
some costs, which we do not specify precisely here. The assumption, however,
is that these costs are independent of
The key matter is the effect of a reduction in trading costs on consuinp-
tion. If the use of a common currency reduces b2 to zero,7 then equation (12)




Theeffect of b1 on Q depends on a:
ceniculn
Sincea higher b1 meaas less trade between the countries (equation [101), one
might have expected the effect of b1€ on 12 to be unambiguously negative—
7The results that we obtain will be the same if costs are reduced but not to zero.
13that is, the benefit from adopting a common currency would be smaller for
countries that naturally trade less. The offsetting force is that, if b1 is large,
the trades that occur must have a high value at the margin to justify the
large trading cost. Specifically, the traded intermediates must have a high
marginal product. Hence, the trade that is facilitated by reducing b2 to zero
has a correspondingly large effect on a country's output and consumption.
The net effect depends on elasticities, which are determined in the model
by the parameter a. If a >1/2,then the various intermediates are rela-
tively close substitutes, and the dominant effect is that a lowering of b2 to
zero saves on the trading costs incurred (which are more important when
the volume of trade is large). if a <1/2,then the intermediates are poor
substitutes, and the dominant effect involves the high marginal product of
intermediates when the trading cost is high. Thus, to get the usual result—
whereby countries or regions that naturally trade a lot would particularly
benefit from using a common currency—one has to assume that the under-
lying tradable goods are relatively close substitutes.
2.3 Monetary Policy
To discuss the interaction between currency unions and monetary policy,
we have to enrich the model to allow a role for nominal prices. We use a
simple setting in which the nominal price of the monopolized intermediate
goods involves some stickiness, whereas the prices of the competitive final
goods are flexible. We describe the model for a two-country world, with
regions r= 1,...,Nincountry1 andi' =N+1,...,Wincountry2.The
generalization to many countries is straightforward.
14For country 1, let Pr be the nominal price of the rth intermediate good
and p the nominal price of final goods (and, hence, consumer goods), all of
which sell at one price. The second country uses a different currency and
denominates its prices, p and jf, in units of that currency. If all nominal
prices were flexible, then the preceding analysis would go through, with the
relative prices of each intermediate good, Pr/P and p/p*, set at the monopoly
level, 1/a, in each country.
Suppose that p and p are determined through some stochastic processes
by each country's monetary authority. (The nominal monetary aggregates,
which we do not model explicitly, adjust to achieve target nominal prices of
final goods in each country.) We assume that the nominal exchange rate, e,
is flexible and adjusts so that the standard PPP condition holds:
(13)
Assume that, in country 1, the nominal price Pr for r = 1,..., N must
be set one period in advance by the producer of each respective type of
intermediate good. (We shall make a parallel assumption about price setting
in country 2.) The nominal price of each of country l's intermediate goods
in the nominal currency unit of country 2 is given from equation (13) by
Pr/C =Pr(p*/p) Hence, the relative price (after division by p*) is Pr/P, just
as in country 1. Quantity demanded of this intermediate good by producers
of final product in both countries will again be a constant-elasticity function
of this relative price.
To find the nominal price Pr that maximizes a country 1 producer's ex-
pected profit, the only new element that we need to know is the probability
15distribution of p. As a first approximation, the set price will be given by
Pr(1/a) . (14)
for r =1,...,N,where Et_ip is the producer's one-period-ahead expectation
of p. Hence, Pr/P =1/a,as before, when p is known with certainty one
period in advance. When p is uncertain, the entire probability distribution
of p will generally matter for the optimal choice of Pr5 However, for present
purposes, we assume that equation (14) is a satisfactory approximation. By
analogy for country 2, we have
(1/a) .Etip* (15)
forr=N+1,...,W.
If p exceeds E_1p, then the relative price pr/p falls correspondingly be-
low the monopoly level, and the demand for country 1 intermediates in both
countries rises above the monopoly level. Analogously, an excess of p" above
Et_ip* raises the demand for country 2 intermediates in both countries above
the monopoly level. We assume, for now, that the producers of intermedi-
ate goods in each country meet the demands that are forthcoming at these






where f() is the producer's one-period-ahead probability density function for p. If a =
1/2,then this expression simplifies to
PrEp)(1+s2),
wheres is the coefficient of variation of p. Hence, in this case, equation (14) holds if the
coefficient of variation is much less than 1.
16reduced real prices. From the standpoint of output in country 1, the param-
eter a&/(1_Y) in equation (2) is then replaced by [a. (p/E1p)]a/(l) for the
N—i external regions of country 1. Similarly, the term [(a. (1— b)]&/(l_dI)
replaced by [a. (1 —b)(p*/E_lp*)]a/(l_a) for the W —Nregions of country
2. Hence, unexpected inflation in either country tends to raise output in
country 1 (and, similarly, for country 2). Moreover, because of the distortion
from the monopoly pricing of the intermediate goods, unexpected inflation
tends to offset the distortion and leads thereby to an efficient expansion of
output. The outcomes p/Et_ap =p*/Et_ip*=1/a> 1 would generate the
efficient levels of production in each country.
However, there are two reasons why too much unexpected inflation would
be undesirable in this model. From the standpoint of producers of interme-
diates from country 1, if p/Et_ip > i/a, then the real price of produced
intermediates falls short of the unit cost of production. Given the constant-
cost assumption, the producers lose money on each unit produced and sold.
If the producers nevertheless meet the demand, then the output of country
1 intermediates is inefficiently high. Alternatively, if the producers shrink
output to zero to avoid losses on each unit produced, then no intermediates
are produced in country 1 and output decreases drastically (in an inefficient
manner). The general lesson is that the effect of unexpected inflation on
relative prices can create distortions as well as reduce existing ones.
Second, with respect to a region's sales of intermediates to other regions
of the same country, some amount of unexpected inflation leads to an efficient
expansion of production but also implies a transfer of income from monopo-
listic providers to consmners. It seems reasonable that a policymaker would
17ignore these domestic transfers, especially because the monopolistic providers
and the consumers are the same agents in the present model. Hence, on this
count, a policymaker would value unexpected inflation, though the marginal
benefit would diminish as unexpected inflation became larger (and would
become negative, as already indicated, if p/Et_ip reached 1/a).
However, with respect to sales to regions of the other country, the loss of
monopoly profits is not compensated by any benefits to domestic residents.
As in the case of a monopoly tariff, the monopolistic providers of intermediate
goods were already optimizing from the standpoint of the home country with
respect to choices of export prices and quantities. Thus, unexpected inflation
at home distorts the results from the perspective of the domestic country
(while simultaneously generating benefits to the foreign country). Moreover,
since the net benefit from the home effect approaches zero as p/Et_1p tends
to 1/a, the net benefit of unexpected domestic inflation to the home country
must become negative before p/E_ip reaches 1/a.
tFom the standpoint of the policymaker for country i, the model ratio-
nalizes a loss function in which some amount of unexpected inflation (for
prices of final product), 7r —ir,reduces the loss. This effect diminishes with
the size of 'n-i —ir,eventually becomes nil, and subsequently changes sign.
The amount of the initial loss reduction and the size of the interval over
which uiiexpected inflation is beneficial depends on the extent of the existing
distortion. In the model, the distortion varies inversely with the parameter a
(see equation [9]). Thus, if we view this parameter as varying across countries
and over time, then the policymaker of country i values unexpected inflation
more when a is lower (that is, when the markup ratio, i/ad, is higher).
182.4 Independent Monetary Policy under Discretion
We assume that the objective of monetary policy in country i can be de-
scribed by the minimization of the expected net costs of inflation, £, which
we write as a fraction of country i's GDP in a simple functional form:
=(7/2)()2+(0/2) [— r)—z— — (16)
The key term is the second one, (0/2) [.(r
—7r)
—z—i]2, whereU > 0,
4> 0, z > 0, and misan error term with zero mean, serial independence, and
constant variance o. This term, which looks like an expectational Phillips
curve, is intended to approximate the results from the preceding section.
Specifically, if rj =0,then unexpected inflation, ir —7r,initially reduces
the loss, £. However, as in the model, the marginal benefit diminishes
and eventually changes sign, when ir —irreaches z. The error term m
correspondsin the model to movements of the markup ratio, i/aj, away
from its mean value. A higher value of m(lowervalue of a) raises the initial
benefit from unexpected inflation and expands the interval over which this
benefit is positive.9
The first term in equation (16), ('y/2)(ir)2, where 'y > 0, captures dead-
°An additional benefit of surprise inflation could reflect effects of surprise inflation
on the real value of nominal obligations, for example, of government debt denominated
in domestic currency. With distorting taxation, these kinds of capital levies would be
valued, because they would reduce the distortions from other sources of revenue. In this
case, a positive m would represent a situation in which this type of revenue is especially
valuable, perhaps because of an emergency that motivates temporarily high levels of public
spending.
19weight losses from actual inflation. We do not model these costs formally
but note that they could reflect costs of changing prices.
The final term in equation (16), —air, where a > 0, represents seignorage
revenue, which is taken to be linear in actual inflation.'0 Thus, the monetary
authority values the seignorage revenue on a one-to-one basis. More generally,
seignorage would be useful to the government because it expands the menu of
taxes available. For an analysis of a currency union, this term is interesting
because it may be allocated in different ways among members of the union.
Country i has the choice of conducting monetary policy on its own or
anchoring to another country. On its own, the inflation rate is assumed to be
determined in a discretionary manner each period to minimize £, as defined
in equation (16). The authority cannot make commitments about inflation,
and the rational formation of expectations, ir—based on information from
the previous period—takes this incapacity into account. The timing is as
follows: first, expectations on inflation are set, then the shock is realized and
publicly observed, then the policyniaker chooses inflation.
The solution for the discretionary equilibrium, which follows the approach
of Barro and Gordon (1983), is
a Oq5z________ 7r=—+—+2 (17)
77('y+OØ)
The resulting expectation of the net costs of inflation can be calculated from
equations (16) and (17) as
'°More complicated functional forms, including making seignorage a function of unex-
pected inflation, would not change the qualitative nature of the results.
20=. —+0z2+(0)2+ . (18) 2 77+9
If the monetary authority could commit inflation at least one period
ahead, then the inflation rate in equation (17) would be reduced by the
inflation-bias term, .Theterm (92inequation (18) reflects these costs
from the inflation bias.
The monetary authority's reaction to the economic disturbance ij,as
shown in equation (17), is a countercyclical policy. This reaction creates
unexpectedly high or low inflation—with corresponding effects on output—in
response to movements of m•Theability of the monetary authority to tailor
inflation to current economic conditions, as represented by ij,isvaluable in
the model, that is, EJJislower than it would be if this ability were absent.
This effect provides the key benefit from an independent monetary policy in
the model. A monetary authority that can commit to an optimal contingent
rule would also have ir responding to minthe manner shown in equation
(17).
2.5 Outcomes under Dollarization
Consider now a potential. anchor country, denoted by the subscript j.We
assmne that this country has the same underlying preference and cost pa-
rameters as country i,thatis, the parameters in equation (16) are the same.
However, the monetary authority of country jisable to commit its method
for choosing inflation at least one period ahead. This authority picks an op-
timal contingent rule (a relation between r and j)tominimize the prior
21expectation of £. The inflation rate in country jwillbe given by the form
of equation (17), except that the inflation bias term is absent:
=(+O2
(19)
Note that country j's monetary authority reacts to its own economic distur-
bance, ij, which is serially independent with zero mean and constant variance
o-. However,need not be independent of ij.
Suppose that country i irrevocably fixes the exchange rate of its currency
to that of country jbyadopting country j's currency. In what follows we
assume that the decision to "dollarize" is irrevocable. That is, even though
country i cannot make a binding connnitment to a policy rule, it can make an
irrevocable commitment to give up its currency. This assumption rests on the
idea that it is institutionally much more costly to renege on a dollarization
commitment than on a monetary policy rule." In the case of a fixed exchange
rate, the inflation rate in country i, ir, would equal r plus the rate of change
of the price of a market basket of goods in country i expressed relative to that
in country j.Weassume that this rate of change of relative prices is given
by an exogenous, random error term, q. This shock is serially independent
with zero mean, constant variance o-, and is distributed independently of the
shocks to economic activity, rj and 7j, in the two countries. Hence, under
dollarization, country i's inflation rate is given by
In any event, a foreign monetary authority lacks the power to erode the real value of
dollar bills. The foreign government may, however, be able to depreciate the real value of
dollar denominated domestic obligations by formal defaults.
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(20)
Thejsuperscriptindicates that the outcome applies for country i under
anchoring to country j.
Ifcountry i no longer issues its own currency, then it loses the seignorage
thcome, given by a7r. The corresponding income accrues instead to coun-
try j.Countryjmayor may not compensate country i for this transfer of
seignorage revenue. We assume, for now, that the anchor returns to country
i the full amount of the seignorage obtained in country i. In this case the
anchor country has no incentive to change its policy regardless of what coun-
try i chooses. We discuss below alternative arrangements. With inflation
determined from equation (20), country i's expected net costs of inflation
are given from equation (16) by:'2
——2-. (7 + O)a 92c52C2
—92q52COV(ij,)
27 2 2 2('y+Oq5) 2
(21)
The covariance between mandrj appears in equation (21) because it deter-
mines the extent to which country j's adjustments to its own disturbances,
are helpful for country i. This criterion neglects any impact of dollariza-
tion on trading costs. In section 3, we combine trading costs with monetary
policy effects in a general discussion of optimal currency areas.
12We are assuming that the form of equation (16) still applies under this regime, al-
though the underlying model assumed a flexible exchange rate.
232.6 The Choice of Whether to Dollarize
We assess here the choice of currency regime based on a comparison of the
monetary and inflation policies that result. The difference between E.C from
equation (18) and E.t from equation (21) is given by
— = . [(7+ 8) a + ()VAR(i
—
(22)
A positive value for A.CU indicates that, the independent regime is more
costly for country i than the system with anchoring to country j.Hence,
anything that raises the terms on the right-hand side of the equation favors
dollarization.
The first term, (92,isthe cost associated with the inflation bias under
a discretionary regime in country i. The linkage to the committed country j
avoidsthese costs and thereby favors doliarization. The second term, which
involves o-, derives from the random shifts in relative prices between coun-
tries i and j.Sincecountry i receives country j's inflation rate only up to
the random error, €,ahigher value for a makes dollarization less attrac-
tive. The third term, which contains VAR( —i), reflectsthe benefits from
an independent monetary policy, in the sense that ir can react to ijinthe
autonomous regime. The extent of this benefit depends on how closely t
moveswith ij.Equation(22) shows that the variance of m—iswhat
matters for the comparison between the regimes.
Note from equation (22) that there are two senses in which greater co-
movement between countries i and jfavorsdollarization. One relates to
the variance of relative prices, a. This effect arises even if the monetary
24authorities do not conduct countercyclical policies. An effect of a applies in
equation (22) even if inflation surprises do not affect output (= 0),as long
as costs, £, depend on actual inflation ('y> 0). Second, a greater variance
of relative economic disturbances, h —ij, makesdollarization less attractive.
2.7 Extensions
2.7.1 Dollarization affects the shocks
It is often argued that a common-currency link affects co-movements among
countries, for example, by promoting trade and factor mobility. If we allow
for an effect of the monetary system on the distributions of the shocks, then
the criterion for dollarization is modified from equation (22) to




whereis the variance of ijinthe autonomous regime, and the unmarked
variances refer to the dollarized system. The last term indicates that dollar-
ization would be favored if this linkage reduces the variance of disturbances
in country i, that is, if ö. > This effect would be predicted if the cur-
rency linkage buffers the disturbances that impinge on country i (because of
the easier adjustments, of trade and factor flows).. Dollarization is also more
attractive the lower a and VAR( —i4—thesevalues are the ones applica-
ble in the dollarized setting. Hence, if linkage reduces these variances, then
dollarization looks more favorable.
252.7.2 Simple rules
The analysis of dollarization has assumed that country jcommitsto the
contingent rule for 7r that minimizes the prior expectation of £.However,
one may argue that commitment is difficult to verify and, hence, maintain
when it involves these sorts of contingent reactions of ir to .Inour model,
the contingent rule is easy to implement and verify, but matters become much
more complicated if shocks are not immediately and universally observable.
The nature of the issue can be illustrated by assuming that country jcan
follow discretion or commit to a simple rule that precludes feedback from
to irs. In this case ir would be set to the constant a/-y.'4Ifthe anchor
follows the simple rule, the next to last term in equation (23) becomes
2(7+82)
This term is smaller in magnitude than the corresponding term in equation
(23) if
a,. >
whereis the correlation (under the dollarized regime) between ijand
Thus, if a. =a,,.,then if p > 1/2 country jismore attractive as an anchor
for country i if country jfollowsan optimal contingent rule where ir responds
to ij.If< 1/2, then country jisa more attractive anchor if it follows the
simple rule in which ir is constant. In other words, active countercyclical
13See, for example, the symposium on central hank independence in the 1995 NEER
Macroeconomic Annual.
141n this situation, country j might prefer discretion to the simple rule. Discretion
allows for flexible responses of 7rto whereasthe simple rule precludes these reactions.
26policy by the anchor country is attractive to linking countries only if their
disturbances (j)are—underthe dollarized system—highly correlated with
those of the anchor (ij4.Thus,for some potential clients, the inability of the
anchor to follow a contingent first-best rule is a plus.
2.7.3 The anchor keeps the seignorage
If country j's objective is to minimize the expectation of £ less the seignor-
age revenue obtained from country i (with no allowance for the costs of
inflation borne by country i), then the only difference from equation (19) is
in the choice of intercept. The new coefficient is
a 1
(1-ri)'
where r Y/(l' + Y) is the shared of country i in the combined GDPs.
Hence, the seignorage obtainable from country i motivates country jtose-
lect higher inflation than otherwise. The greater is i-themore inflation is
raised above its previous level, a/'y. Thus, if the anchor country values the
seignorage obtainable from clients but does not consider the costs that in-
flation imposes on these clients, then dollarization can be inflationary. The
results are different, as discussed below, if the anchor takes account of the
costs imposed on clients.
2.7.4 Adjustments by the anchor country with compensation
Another issue is whether the anchor country would be motivated to alter
its policies to consider the interests of the linking countries, in effect, the
clients of the anchor. We explore whether a system of transfers can make an
27adjustment of the anchor's policy mutually beneficial.'5
The net cost of inflation, £, from equation (16) applies as a fraction of
country i's GDP, Y. If we take the universe as the anchor country jplus
one linking country i, then the total net cost due to inflation, expressed as a
share of the combined GDPs, Y + Y, is
(24)
where r Y/(Y + Y) and r Y/(Y + 11). One possibility is that the
anchor country determines its policy rule to minimize the prior expectation
of £, rather than £, as assumed before. The £ objective weighs foreigners'
net costs equally with those of domestic residents. Such an objective need
not reflect global altruism by the anchor nation. Rather, this objective would
emerge in equilibrium from competition among anchor countries, assuming
that clients effectively compensate the anchor for deviating from policies that
are otherwise best for the anchor's domestic residents. One way that this
compensation could occur, as part of a competitive equilibrium, is for each
anchor country to retain the amount of seignorage that just compensates for
the worsening of policy from a domestic perspective. If there is not enough
seignorage revenue to compensate, then some other mechanism would have
to be devised to allow international payments for monetary services.
Let the anchor's policy rule be designated by
= + vr + vi + veij, (25)
15A complex political game may be involved in the fixing and implementation of these
schemes. This game is not modeled here.
28where (bL, v, v,are the feedback coefficients chosen by the monetary
authority. Equation (19) is the special case of equation (25) that arises when
£ depends only on £. The inclusion of £ as part of the revised objective
will affect the choice of some of the coefficients in equation (25), but the
linear form will still be optimal in the. present model.'6
If country j's objective is to minimize the prior expectation of £, then








Theconstant term, ji= a/-y,is the same as before. That is, the consider-
ation of the broader universe that encompasses country i does not change the
average inflation rate chosen by country j.Hence,dollarization is not infla-
tionary when the anchor takes account of costs imposed on clients. Country
j's response, v, to its own economic disturbance, ij,isthe same as before,
except that the coefficient is attenuated by multiplication by the GDP share,
. Correspondingly, the anchor's choice of inflation, 7r, now reacts in accor-
dance with the coefficient v to country i's economic disturbance, .This
16Note that we have returned to the setting in which cOuntry j can commit to a coñtin-
gent rule in the sense of committing to the coefficients shown in equation (25). We also
neglect here, for simplicity, any effect of dollarization on the distribution of the distur-
bances, as explored before.
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response depends on country i's GDP share, r. The coefficient z' =
meansthat country j's monetary authority partly offsets an increase in rel-
ative prices in country i by lowering ir. The extent of the offset is given by
'ri, the share of country i's GDP.
tFrom the perspective of minimizing the expectation of its own net costs,
£, country j's reactions of ir to mand€Landthe insufficient reaction of
toare, per Se, unattractive. That is why this behavior by country j
hingeson some sort of compensating payment from country i to country j.
Asalready mentioned, one possibility is that country jretainpart of the
seignorage income associated with country i's use of country j's money.
On its own, country jchoosesthe inflation rate 7r given in equation (19).
With the accommodation to country i, country jchoosesthe inflation rate
given by equations (25) and (26). The amount that country jlosesfrom the
accommodation can be calculated by looking at the difference in expected
costs, £, associated with the two choices of inflation. The result is
Cost of acconunodation (27)
=
(T)2. {(7+ O) a + (). VAR(-
Thus,the cost to country jdependson the relative size of country i, Ti,
on the variance of the relative price shocks, c, and on the variance of the
difference in the economic disturbances, ij —q.If there were no relative
price shocks and no differences in economic disturbances, then it would be
costless for country jtoaccommodate its inflation choice to country i.
Suppose now that country i can choose whether to link to country j,that
country jaccommodatesits inflation choice to the presence of country i (as
implied by equations [25] and [26]), and that country i pays the compensation
30corresponding to equation (27).17Thecriterion for country i to dollarize is
then modified from equation (22) to
=___ - . {( +O) a + (°). VAR(i— (28)
The new element in equation (28) is that the terms involving cr and
VAR(7] — aresmaller in magnitude than before because they are multi-
plied by r, which is less than one. These terms are smaller because country
j's partial adjustment of 7r for country i's disturbances makes these distur-
bances less costly for country i (even after considering the compensation that
country i pays to country j).Thus,overall, the choice of dollarization looks
more favorable because of the anchor country's willingness to accommodate
its clients.
Another result from equation (28) is that a smaller value for r makes
dollarization more attractive. The reason is that a smaller 'r reduces the
compensation that country i must pay to country jforits acconunodations.
In this model, the attraction of dollarization is that it buys a committed
monetary policy. A small anchor country is, in this respect, as good as a large
one, because the commitment technology is assumed to work as well in either
case. However, for the large anchor country, the costs of accommodating to
country i are greater (because the term in equation [27] applies over a larger
scale, )').Thus,for given values of c and VAR(ij —ij),the small country
is preferred as an anchor.
The conclusion about the desirable size of the anchor country may change
if the capacity to maintain a commitment depends on the relative economic
17Tlie level of compensation is the amount shown in equation (27) multiplied by Yj.
31sizes of the anchor country and its customers. For example, consider a large
country, such as Russia, using a small one, say Latvia, as an anchor. This
arrangement may not work because ex-post pressure from Russia to create
"unanticipated" inflation could be too much for Latvia to bear. In other
words, anchors that are larger (in relation to their clients) may be more solid
because they can better withstand pressures to be time inconsistent.
3 Number of countries and of currencies
3.1 The setup
We now combine issues of trade and monetary policy to investigate the equi-
librium mutiber of currency unions in a world composed of an exogenous
number of independent countries. To keep things simple, we return to the
case of no compensation from clients to anchors, and we neglect any effect
of dollarization on the variances of shocks.
In this situation, equation (22) implies that the criterion for country i to
prefer linkage to country joverautonomy is given by
=(Oz)2— {+O) a + (2)VAR(ij
—)} > 0.
(29)
Recall that this criterion assumes that country jfollowsa committed policy,
whereas country i would, on its own, follow a discretionary policy. Hence,
the first element in the choice about currency unions is whether a country
can make a commitment to a rule for monetary policy. We assume that there
32are two types of countries in this respect. The indicator /3 takes the value
one if country i can make binding commitments and zero if it cannot. We
treat this commitment ability as exogenous and do not allow for intermediate
cases in which some form of partial commitment is feasible.
The second element concerns the distribution parameters for the distur-
bances in equation (29). Linkage is more attractive if a and VAR(i11 —
arelow under the dollarized system. We focus here on a key factor that would
influence these distribution parameters—the extent to which countries i and
jarelinked by trade.18
Let I. be the value of the bilateral trade between countries i and j.
Equation(10) implies that this trading volume depends inversely on trading
costs, represented by the parameter =b15+b2,and positively on country
sizes, N and N:
7. =ALa'Rl.(1 —b)a/(l_a)
.
We posit that b1 increases with the distance between the countries. In
the empirical gravity literature, the concept of distance captures physical
distance and other factors, such as language, colonial history, sharing a bor-
der, being an island, etc. In our formalization, we assinne that a country's
position along the line segment that describes the world captures all these
aspects of distance. Formally, ifis the distance between the mid-points
of countries i and j,thenb1 is increasing in Hence, It'. is decreasing in
18See Imbs (2000) for a review of the literature on how trade affects co-movements of
output. Engel and Rose (2000) investigate determinants of the variances of relative prices,
as measured by real exchange rates.
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The trade volume is increasing in the size of each country. However, the
correlation between the shocks of the two economies will be related to the
volume of trade scaled in some manner by country sizes. Ifis the trade
volume scaled by size, then we assume that the largerthe lower are
and VAR(ij —ii).Thus, smaller D1 and, hence, higher lP raise &C in
equation (29).
If the adoption of a common currency reduces trading costs, then we
noted before that the currency linkage also has a direct positive effect on
trade, output, and consumption. Equation (12) shows how the trading cost,
relates to consumption:
Effect on consumption of country i =AL.(1
—a2)
.a11' . (1— . NIV.
Let A(1 —b)0/(l_a)> 0 represent the effect from the reduction in b2
caused by the adoption of a currency union. The effect of union on country
i's consumption—expressed as a ratio to Ni—is then given by
=AL.(1 —a2)
.a° .z(1
— > 0. (30)
The consumption gain is increasing in N and in the term, A(1 —
thatreflects the reduction in trading costs. As discussed in section 2.3, if
a > 1/2, then lower b1-caused, say, by smaller D—raises the effect of
a reduction in b2 on Hence, if a > 1/2, the trade effect provides
another reason for smallerto favor dollarization.
Country i will now choose to link to country j depending on whether the
total benefit, given by ae"+AC", is positive. The country therefore ca±es
34about the expression
AL + ZC'- = — 3,7, A), (31)
where F) increases with —fiand N and faJis with(because of the
reduction of
Weare interested in an equilibrium defined as follows:
Definition: An equilibrium is a configuration of currency unions in
which no country belonging to a union would like to leave the union to have its
own currency or to join another union. In addition, no country not belonging
to a union would like to join one.
We begin by imposing some structure on the problem.
3.2 The case of equal country sizes
Assume first that the world consists of M countries of equal size N =1/M.
Obviously, countries for which 3 =1have a comparative advantage at pro-
viding the currencies used in multi-country currency unions. One can easily
show that the largestfor which country i would adopt the currency of
country jislarger if =1than if =0.Suppose that there are M coun-
tries, numbered from 1 to M from left to right. Assume that fik =13h=1,
with 1 Ck<h￿ M and =0for ik, h. In the following, we let Nt'
represent the size of the currency union that a country is considering joining.
The possible configurations of equilibria are as follows:
35Configuration of equilibria: If countries i and i + 2 belong to the
same currency union, so does country i + 1. If F(O,T, N") <0for all i,j
and any N", then the possible configurations are: 1) M currencies in the
world, no currency unions; 2) two currencies in the world, those of country
k and country h; if k —1=M—h,then the two currency unions intlude an
equal number of countries, rn =M/2;3) two multi-country currency unions
adopting currencies k and h, composed respectively of 7k and mh countries.
The remaining (M —mh—
771k)countries all have their own currency. If
k —1=M—h,then mk =mh.
If F(0,T,N")0, dependingoni,j andN", then the additional possible
configurations are as follows: 4)allthe countries adopt one currency, either
that of country k or country h; 5) C>2 multi-country currency unions that
include a total of M' < M countries.
The first statement implies that currency unions are formed by adjacent
countries. This result depends on all the countries having the same size.
The sufficient condition that isolates the first three cases implies that the
only countries that would want to adopt a currency other than their own are
=0countries, which may adopt the currency of a committed anchor. This
condition tends to be satisfied if the main reason to enter a currency union
is to obtain the policy commitment of the anchor. That is, the first term on
the left side of equation (31) is dominant. Also, if the benefits from trade
arising from sharing the same currency are relatively low, then not much is
gained by fi= 0countries (or j3 =1countries) in giving up an independent
monetary policy. A third factor that would work in favor of satisfying this
condition is a high value of VAR(rj —oro, for given trade shares. Case 2
36is a situation in which all the countries belong to one of two currency unions.
This outcome tends to emerge when country shocks are similar or the trade
benefits from belonging to a union are high. In case 3, some of the countries
with /3 =0are too far from countries /tandh and their currency unions to
join either union.
If 17(0,Nt') > 0 for some countries, then some countries may want
to form a union even without the benefit of commitment. This outcome
arises if the trade gains are sufficient to compensate for the loss of monetary
autonomy. In this situation two or more non-committed countries may form
a union, because they are too far from a /3= 1country. For instance, consider
two countries with /30bordering each other but far from any country with
/3= 1.These countries may form a currency union if the trade benefits are
sufficiently high and the benefit of commitment comes at too high a price
because of the great distance of the closest /3= 1country. An analogous
argiunent applies to countries with j3 =1.Thus, two additional possibilities
emerge. In case 4, all the countries adopt the same currency, either of country
/torh. In case 5, some of the countries that do not belong to the currency
unions of k or iiincase 3 form their own multi-country currency union. A
natural example is one in which countries k and h are close to the extremes
of the line segment, so that a large range of countries in the middle of the
line segment is far from a committed anchor country. A set of countries in
the middle may then find it beneficial to form a currency union even without
the benefits of commitment.'9
19An interesting example is the discussion about a monetary union in Central America,
as an alternative to dollarization.
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3.3 Many countries and few currencies
As the number of countries increases, the equilibrium number of currencies
may go up less than proportionally with the number of countries or may
even decrease. Consider the following example with 3 countries of equal
size—thus of size 1/3—numbered from 1 to 3 from left to right. Suppose
that $i =/33=1and /2 =0and that each country has its own currency.
This configuration means that country 2 prefers autonomy, which implies,
from equation (31), that2°
F(1,T21,1/3) <0 and ['(1, T23, 1/3) <0. (32)
Suppose now that country 2 splits exogenously into two equal-sized coun-
tries, labeled from left to right by 2a and 2b. In the new situation, countries
2a and 2b may find it attractive to adopt the currencies of countries 1 and 3,
respectively. Consider, for instance, country 2a. This country prefers to use
the currency of country 1 if
F(1,T2a,i,1/3) >0. (33)
Note, since D1,2a < Di2, T2,1 > T. Therefore, conditions (32) and (33)
can both be satisfied. Furthermore, country 2a does not want to adopt the
currency of 2b instead of that of 1 if
I'(1,T2,1, 1/3) > I'(0,T2a2o, 1/6). (34)
2O follows immediately, if this condition holds, that it is not in the interest of countries
1 and 3 to form a currency union without country 2. A three-country currency union is
also not an equilibrium.
38This condition can be satisfied together with the previous two, but it is
not satisfied for all parameter values, because D2,2< Da,i.Analogous
considerations apply to country 2b and its decision to adopt the currency of
country 3.
In summary, the example shows that a configuration of 3 countries/3
currencies can be an equilibrium and one with 4 countries/2 currencies can
also be an equilibrium. Hence, as the number of countries increases, the
number of currencies may fall. Two forces underlie this result. One is that
smaller countries benefit more from currency unions because a larger fraction
of their economy relies on foreign trade. The second is that a new country
can be closer to an anchor than the original larger country to which the new
one originally belonged.
By the same logic, consider the case of an initial 4 countries/4 currencies
equilibrium. The two middle countries (2 and 3) are those with 3 =0.
Suppose that the two middle countries split in half, becoming 2a and 2b and
3a and 3b, respectively. It is easy to verify that countries 2a and 3bmay
want to adopt the currencies of country 1 and 4, respectively. The other
countries 2b and 3a may not adopt these anchor currencies because they are
further away from the respective anchors. Hence, the equilibrium can move
from 4 countries/4 currencies to 6 countries/4 currencies. It is also possible
that countries 2b and 3a may want to form a currency union of their own
even without a committed monetary policy. In this case, the new equilibrium
would have 6 countries/3 currencies.
3.4 Countries of different size
39Suppose now that countries come in two sizes, large and small, denoted by
iiandN, respectively. We can have four types of countries in terms of size
and commitment ability: 1) Size N, /3 =1;2) Size N, /3 =0;3) Size n,
/3= 1;4) Size n, j3 =0.
Consider now the configuration of equilibria. A trivial case is one in which
there are only countries of types 1 and 4, that is, the committed countries are
also the large countries. The results of section 3.2 generalize immediately.
A more interesting case is one in which all four types of countries exist. In
this case, an important difference from before is that currency unions are
not necessarily formed by countries adjacent to each other. For instance,
suppose country jisof type 3 (small but committed), country j+1 is of
type 2 (large but not committed), and country j+2 is of type 4 (small and
not committed). It is possible that F(l,Tj÷i,n) <0<F(i,T+2,n). That
is, it may be in the interest of a small but relatively far country (j+2) to
adopt the currency of an anchor (j),althougha closer but larger country
(j+1) may opt out. For example, it may be in the interest of Panama and
El Salvador to adopt the dollar, although it may not be in the interest of
Mexico; or it may be in the interest of Latvia and Estonia to link to the euro,
although it may not be worthwhile for Poland. The intuition is clear: the
small country may have a higher trade share with the anchor even though it
is farther away, precisely because it is small.
Another dimension in which countries differ is in their location. A country
at the extreme of the line segment is relatively far from more countries than
a country located in the middle. Ceteris pan bus, a country in the middle is
40a more likely anchor than a country at the extremes.21 Therefore, a small
uncommitted country at the "borders" of the world is the least likely anchor,
whereas a large committed country in the middle is the most likely anchor.
Obviously, the real world is not a line segment and these observations have
to be interpreted curn grano saiLs, but the point is that New Zealand may be
a less likely anchor than Switzerland, not only because of the different infla-
tionary histories of the two countries but also because of their geographical
locations.
4 Conclusions
Currency unions have several real and monetary effects. To the extent that
trade costs are lowered by a common currency, the latter leads to real out-
put and consumption gains. The loss of monetary flexibility has costs and
benefits. On the one hand, a country giving up its currency loses a stabi-
lization device targeted to domestic shocks; on the other hand, it may gain
credibility and thereby reduce undesired inflation. We have shown how the
determination of optimal currency areas depends on a complex web of vari-
ables and interactions, including the size of countries, their "distance," the
levels of trading costs, the correlations between shocks, and on institutional
arrangements that determine how the seignorage is allocated and whether
transfers between members of a union are feasible. The type of country with
the strongest incentive to give up its own currency is a small country with
21Note that the literature on the gravity model (e.g. Rose [2000]) accounts for the
remoteness" of a country with an appropriate empirical specification.
41a history of high inflation that is close (in a variety of different ways) to a
large and monetarily stable country.
As the number of countries increases, their average size decreases and
the volume of international transactions rises. As a result, more and more
countries will find it profitable to give up their independent currency. We
have shown that it is possible that as the number of coimtries increases, the
number of currencies may not ordy increase less than proportionally but may
even fall.
5 Appendix: The Model of Output, Trade,
and Country Size




where r belongs to country i that contains individuals v =1,...,N;Xr is the
total of intermediates produced by r; and we used the expression for output
from equation (1):
YrA (A2)
The first-order conditions for maximizing Cr relate the quantities of inter-
mediate inputs employed by individual r, Xv,., to the price,in accordance
42I,
with
AaLX' = 1, (A3)
AaLl_ax_l = P,v=1,...,Nj(#r),
AaL1-X-1 =
The first-order condition for choosing Pr to maximize Cr is
(Pr1)6(XrXrr),Pr = —1, (A4)
where the c term denotes the elasticity of demand for exports, X, —Xrr,with
respect to Pr.
Conditionsof the form of equation (A3) determine the demand, Xrv, from
the other producers for v's intermediate goocL Each- of these demands and
(since the relative weights are fixed) the overall demand have constant price
elasticities equal to —1/ (1—a). Substitution of this result into equation (A4)
determines the monopoly price of intermediates to be the constant
P = 1/a. (A5)
This price is the same for all intermediate goods.
Substituting P = 1/a into equation (A3) determines the quantities of
intermediates:
Xrr = (Aa)"1° L, (AG)
= (Aa2)'R' .v= 1,..., N ($ r),
Xvr = [Aa2 (1 —b)Ih/_a)
.L,v = N11, ...,W.
Substitution of the results from equation (A6) into equation (A2) leads
to the expression for output in equation (2):
43Yr = AL{1+aQ/u_0). [(Ni—i) + (1 _b)a/(l_a). (w—N)]}, (A7)
where A Ah/(Y)ac/(l_0). The result for consumption can be obtained
by substituting from equations (A5)-(A7) into equation (Al) to get equation
(7):
Cr= AL.(1— a)• {i + (1 + a) [(Ni—i) + (1— b)l0) (W —Ni)]}
(A8)
An individual's total value of purchases of intermediates can be deter-
mined by multiplying the quantities Xv,.forv r from equation (A6) by the
monopoly price, F1, =1/a,as





This expression is gross of the losses from the iceberg transaction costs. The
first term inside the brackets, N —1,corresponds to purchases from individ-
uals of the same country (equation [3]), whereas the second, (1 —
(W
—Ni),corresponds to foreign imports (equation [4]). Equation (A6) can
also be used to show that an individual's sales of intermediates—to persons
in the same country and to foreigners—equals the value of purchases.
The ratio of the value of trade to output is given from equations (A7)
and (A9) by
1/(1—a). [N—1+ (1 —b)&/(l_a)
.(W
—Ni)] Value of trade/output =




jf n/(i—a) [(Ni —1)+ (1 — (W
—N1)]>> 1, then this ratio is
approximately equal to the constant a and is therefore roughly independent
of N1 and b.
The total trade ratio breaks down into two parts:
ah/(1_a) (N —1) Value of domestic trade/output =+ a/(x) [(Ni —1)+ (1 —b)a/(l—k)(147— N1)]
(All)
and
(1 —b)/(')(W —N1) Value of foreign trade/output =1 + aa/(1_)[(N1
—1)+ (1 —b)a/(l_a)(W —N1)]
(Al2)
Hence, the domestic trade ratio in equation (All) rises with N1 and b,
whereas the foreign trade ratio in equation (A12) falls with N1 and b.
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